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Abstract: This paper analyses the integration of financial market supervision at international level,
particularly focusing on EU law and the actual processes taking place in this area considering Brexit
as its part. Current legislative action at EU level has a significant impact on legislation in all member
countries of European Union. This paper seeks, among other things, to find the causes of the
increasingly ongoing process of integration of financial market supervision and determine whether or
not the direction in which the international integration is going is the right one. The objective of this
paper is to determine whether or not the process of integration increases the efficiency of financial
market supervision itself and helps to develop the European single market, while simultaneously
reducing systemic risk to financial market stability.
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1. Introduction
The aim of this article is not merely to analyze the current status of financial market supervision,
but is also to propose a possible outcome to the current process that could happen in the near future
to adjust supervision of the financial market. Financial system development in recent decades has
brought numerous new products, possibilities and ways of operating with financial instruments
within the financial market. One of the obvious results of this development is the globalization of the
financial market. In the author’s opinion, there are no longer any local or national financial markets;
the majority is at supranational level. In Europe, this is already the well established and could be
described as the supranational financial market, which functions alongside the existence of a banking
union. The banking union is quite a new project and remains still not yet fully operational, but already
leads the way of supervision within Europe. There is an interesting question of where Brexit will leave
the economic status of the EU, including financial market supervision of the UK. Is it going to assume
the position of another country in the agreement of the European Economic Area (the EEA)1 besides
Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein, or something else?
1 The Agreement was signed on the 1st January 2004 by the European Commission, EU member countries and three EFTA
countries that wished to participate in the European Free Trade Association. The main objective of the EEA Agreement is
to ensure in all 31 states free movement of goods, persons, services and capital—the ‘four freedoms’. As a result of this
agreement, Union law is, as far as the four freedoms are concerned, implemented into the national legal system of EFTA
countries. All new relevant EU legal regulations are also implemented into the EEA Agreement so they apply to the entire
EEA area (not just the EU) and they ensure a unified application of legal norms relating to a single market. In this case, we
refer to the norms as EEA relevant. EFTA countries are, however, not fully responsible, unlike the EU member countries.
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2. Beginning of Integrated Supervision
This section is divided by subheadings. It will provide a concise and precise description of
experimental results, their interpretation as well as the experimental conclusions that can be drawn.
Banking union is an institutional and functional response to the financial crisis experienced since
2008. Banking union was preceded by another reform known as the European System of Financial
Supervision2 (ESFS) where the single market was presented as one of the goals of the European Union.
One of the key resources for operational functioning of the single market is single and centralized
supervision.3 Centralized supervision is built upon two levels of supervision—macroprudential and
microprudential. The goal of macroprudential supervision/code of practice is the stability of the
EU financial system with soft law (non-binding competences, recommendations etc.). The aim of
microprudential supervision, on the other hand, is operation with legally binding decision-making
competences.4
Macroprudential supervision is represented by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB).
Microprudential supervision is represented by the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), which
means that this supervisory pillar is not carried out by a set of EU bodies.
2.1. Macroprudential Supervision
The ESRB is an EU-level body responsible for macroprudential supervision. The ESRB’s mission is
to prevent, or at least mitigate, systemic risks that threaten to disrupt financial stability (Verhelst 2011).
This organization is based on Article 114 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU). It is not a European agency, as it has no legal status and no legal authority. It is something
akin to a soft-law organization with a good reputation influencing recipients by means of its decisions
or recommendations.
It must be established that the structure, staff and proceedings of the ESRB are such that they
instill confidence in its ability to: (a) make independent judgments; (b) produce high-quality analyses;
and (c) reach sharp, clear conclusions (Goldby and Keller 2010).
This unit collects and analyses relevant information and data from all EU member countries
and evaluates such information for the purpose of identifying systemic risks. The most useful tools
are warnings and recommendations issued by the ESBR when needed. They are addressed to the
EU as a whole or to one or more member states, ESAs, or national supervisory authorities, and
recommendations are addressed specifically to the European Commission. As mentioned previously,
none of the tools used by the ESRB are legally binding, but recommendations operate through an
2 ESFS was based on the Larosiére report and caused EU financial supervisory system’s reform, which is built on macro and
micro prudential pillar.
3 Legislatively new supervisors were established by a Regulation of the European Parliament and the European Council.
- Regulation of the European Parliament and European Council Regulation no. 1092/2010 of 24 November 2010 on the
macro prudential oversight of the financial system in the European Union and establishing a European Systemic Risk
Board (hereinafter also referred to as “Regulation ESRB”).
- Regulation of the European Parliament and European Council Regulation no. 1093/2010 of 24 November 2010
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision no. 716/2009/EC
and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (hereinafter also referred to as “EBA Regulation”).
- Regulation of the European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) no. 1094/2010 of 24 November 2010 establishing
a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions), amending Decision no.
716/2009/EC and repealing Decision 2009/79/EC (hereinafter also referred to as “Regulation EIOPA”).
- Regulation of the European Parliament and European Council Regulation no. 1095/2010 of 24 November 2010
establishing a European supervisor Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision no.
716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC (hereinafter “Regulation ESMA”; regulation EBA,
EIOPA and ESMA all three together as well as the “ESA Regulation”).
4 Macro prudential supervision is the analysis of trends and imbalances in the financial system and the detection of systemic
risk that these trends, may pose to financial institutions and the economy. The focus of macro prudential supervision is the
safety of the financial and economic system as a whole, the prevention of systemic risk. See (House of Lords 2009).
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“act or explain”5 and “naming and shaming”6 mechanism, aiming at compliance. These mechanisms
serve the aim that addressees concur with recommendations. If they do not, they have to provide
substantive reasons for deviation from the ESBR recommendation (in certain cases in the public
domain) (Ferran and Alexander 2011).
Rising private sector debt may also trigger a fiscal bailout that spills over to peripheral Euro-area
countries, even if the government had very low government debt before the bailout (for example,
Spain). In such a case, more scrutiny by a centralized financial supervision can be crucial, only that
this time it would concentrate on macro and systemic risk (as the macroprudential supervision so far
attached to the ECB in the form of ESRB) (Blessing 2013). The centralization of financial supervision is
the key point to prevent systemic risk, although systemic risk itself will never vanish completely.
The disadvantage of the ESBR is the fact that its data sources come from local national databases
and some countries might not wish to admit some irregularity of the system or individual institutions.
The possible problem for confirming the high reputation of the ESBR could be the problem of
identifying threats. In cases where the threat is not identified or is assessed incorrectly, consequences
similar to those brought about out by the financial crisis might occur. On the other hand, threats that
are not real might be identified. Every single false warning might cause a reduction in credibility
and reputation, because most of the accepted warnings bring extra costs for some of the competing
financial institutions. This is just a question of sensitive application for the ESBR, which must deal
with the situation successfully.
2.2. Microprudential Supervision
The European Supervisory Authorities are probably the most important part of the ESFS. The
responsibility of the ESAs has increased significantly and received defined, legally binding tools,
greater autonomy and broader competence as a result of reform (Rodriguez 2009).
The ESAs consist of three supervisory agencies,7 the Joint Committee of the ESA and the Board
of Appeal. All three ESAs agencies have practically the same organizational structure: (a) Board of
Supervisors; (b) Management Board; (c) Chairperson; (d) Executive Director; (e) Joint Committee;
(f) Board of Appeal (The Joint Committee and the Board of Appeal operate within the ESA in an
institutionalized form, as a common unit of the ESA); and (g) Stakeholder groups.8
The three European Supervisory Authorities have rule-making, decision-making and supervisory
powers, but the ESMA is the only agency with direct enforcement powers over (private) financial
market participants (Scholten and Luchtman 2017).9
The main decision-making body is the Board of Supervisors, whose members hold the right to
vote and are the chairmen of national supervisors who decide by simple majority. Because of the
large number of members of this body, it is not sufficiently operational, and for this reason, there is an
executive body, the Management Board, within which operates a chairman and six other members.
The Management Board is the main bearer and executor of the objectives and tasks entrusted to the
ESA. Members of the Board of Supervisors with a voting right are the ones who are elected from
5 The addresses shall communicate to the ESBR and the Council the actions undertaken as a reflection for recommendation or
shall explain any inaction.
6 It refers the activity of saying publicly that addresses, has behaved in a bad or illegal way. It could mean bad publicity
for that addresses which didn’t follow compliance of recommendation. (Detailed description of naming and shaming
mechanism see (Pfalzer 2014)).
7 European Banking Authority—EBA; European securities and markets authority—ESMA; European insurance and
Occupational pensions authority.
8 Stakeholder groups includes for example group Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group (Stakeholder group of Securities
and Markets) to which the ESMA should consult the preparation of technical standards and regulations to create a set
of common rules (common rulebook). This group is composed of 30 members, representing in balanced proportions EU
financial market participants, their employees as well as consumers, investors and users of financial services. Similarly, in
case of EBA and EIOPA Stakeholder Groups. (See. Article 37 of the ESA Regulation and (Emmenegger 2010)).
9 ESMA’s responsibilities and powers in this context are provided by CRA Regulation (EC) no. 1060/2009 and Delegated
Regulation no 946/2012, EMIR regulation no. 648/2012 and Delegated Regulation no. 667/2014.
Int. J. Financial Stud. 2018, 6, 20 4 of 17
among themselves, the members of the Management Board as well as the Chairperson and Executive
Director of the ESAs. In this manner, through the chairmen of the national supervisory authorities,
member states are an influence in their decision-making.
When mention is made of the ESAs’ competences, it is very important to clarify that these agencies
do not work as day-to-day supervisory bodies of financial institutions. This task remains in the hands
of national supervisors.10 The ESAs operate with soft-law instruments and legally binding authority.
All the ESAs have very similar tasks; only ESMA has the one extra competence of forbidding certain
financial activities when necessary.
The particular tasks and tools of the ESAs could be divided into 3 sections (see Table 1 bellow).
Those are quasi-regulatory competences, supervisory competences and legally binding decisions in
the form of law enforcement. The fundamental focus of the ESAs is precisely on having this third
group of tools at their disposal. As such, these tools are the essential factors that have brought about
this reform of supervision.
Table 1. Tools and tasks of the ESAs.
Quasi-regulatory competences
Preparation of technical standards—regulatory and implementing
Recommendations and guidelines for identical and correct application of EU law
Supervisory Competences
Micro
Supporting and monitoring the efficient, effective and consistent functioning of colleges
of supervisors
Support coordination between supervisory authorities in specific situations
Carrying out regular analyses of the mutual evaluation (peer reviews) some or all of the
activities of international supervisors
Monitoring and assessment of market developments and, if necessary, informing other
ESAs, the ESBR, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the
current micro-prudential trends, risks and vulnerable areas
Building of and support for common EU supervisory culture
Macro
Cooperation with the ESRB and the follow-up to its warnings and recommendations in
the matter of systemic risk (risk dashboard)
Indicators and criteria for assessing systemic risk and an adequate stress testing regime
Making the necessary supplementary guidelines and recommendations for key financial
institutions while taking into account the systemic risk they pose
Inquiry of financial activities, type of product or conduct and subsequent




In the case of a breach of EU law, issuing specific recommendations to the national
supervisory authorities
Action in critical situations addressed to financial institutions
Legally binding decisions made during the settlement of disagreements between
competent authorities in cross-border situations
The enforcement powers of ESMA’s for Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) and Trade
Repositories (TRs)
Source: author’s own processing.
2.3. Single Rulebook
One of the main objectives of the ESAs is to work on the single rulebook. ESA Regulation does not
define exactly what is meant by such a code. The Council of Ministers described the single rulebook as
a basic set of rules and standards across the EU that are directly applicable to all financial institutions
operating in the single market (Council of the European Union 2009). However the fact remains
that even this statement is not an unequivocal determinant of what a single rulebook is, and for this
reason there is ample room for interpretation by the ESAs, who, on the other hand, can also generate
contradictions between supervisors.
However, the single rulebook does not include a complete harmonization of the rules applicable
to financial institutions that should lead to less contradictory financial legislation in all member
10 See recital 9 of the EBA and ESMA Regulation and recital 8 of EIOPA Regulation.
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states. This results in fewer opportunities to resolve regulatory dispute (regulatory arbitrage)11 and a
reduction in gold-plating12 issues (Verhelst 2011).
In general, supervisory practices vary from one member state to another and regulatory arbitrage
arises in cases when a contradiction between member states brings efficiency losses for a single market.
The ESAs should, therefore, have the necessary powers to effectively coordinate supervisory actions
carried out by national supervisory authorities both when authorizing or registering an undertaking
and as part of an ongoing review of supervisory practices.
A possible solution for avoiding regulatory arbitrage is to centralize powers in the hands of ESAs.
One of the first steps could be found in the enforcement powers of the ESMA’s for credit rating agencies
(CRAs) and trade repositories (TRs). When there are more financial market institutions under the direct
supervision of ESAs, there is no place for conflicting legislation in Member states. One possible way
could be seen in the new proposed practice of ESMA considering certain types of prospectuses with a
cross-border dimension, where their approval is centralized at the level of the ESMA.13 The centralization
of their approval, as well as all related supervisory and enforcement activities at the level of the ESMA,
will enhance the quality, consistency and efficiency of supervision in the union, create a level playing
field for issuers and lead to a reduction of the timeline for approvals. It will eliminate the need to choose
a “Home Member State” and prevent forum-shopping (European Parliament 2017).
The other possible solution is to produce more detailed harmonization of the rules applicable
to financial institutions for the single rulebook. These rules should allow less space for conflicting
financial legislation in member states and therefore fewer regulatory arbitrages.
ESAs have two tools to reach the goals mentioned above. The first tool is non-binding regulatory
recommendations and guidelines.14 An ESA can address these recommendations and guidelines
to national supervisors as well as individual financial institutions. These recipients should comply
with such recommendations and guidelines. In cases where they fail to do so, it is necessary for the
supervisor to sufficiently justify such action. However, this only applies to financial institutions and
only if the recommendation or guideline explicitly expresses such a request.
The second tool is the regulation and implementation of technical standards.15 Implementing
standards ensures uniform implementation of EU law without legislative changes. Regulatory
standards supplement or amend legislation, but only elements that are non-essential.16
ESAs make “only” draft standards for the European Commission, which is the body that decides
on their approval. By the same token, the recommendations and guidelines are not legally binding, and
from this we can deduce its “quasi” nature, because ESAs do not in fact have regulative competences.17
On the other hand, the ability of the European Commission in relation to draft standards is limited
in terms of their change. The European Commission may intervene in drafts only if ESAs fail to
provide adequate drafts within the stipulated deadline. In practice, the Commission only endorses
the drafts of ESAs in exceptional cases, and that therefore gives added value to the quasi-regulative
competence of ESAs.
It follows from the above that the drafts of technical standards have a greater impact on the
harmonization of legislation in the financial market than guidelines and recommendations (as a
11 Regulatory arbitrage—Differences in financial regulation created incentives for “regulatory arbitrage”, i.e., Situation where
financial institutions seek regulatory framework as considerate as possible. Member States that feared—or vice versa tried
to benefit from—regulatory arbitrage, recommends to reduce the level of regulatory requirements. (For more details, see
(Tabellini 2008)).
12 This is a situation where Member States may introduce stricter regulatory rules if they want.
13 These are the wholesale non-equity prospectuses offered only to qualified investors, the prospectuses which relate to specific
types of complex securities, such as asset backed securities, or which are drawn up by specialist issuers and the prospectuses
drawn up by third country issuers entities in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2017/1129.
14 Article 16 of the ESA Regulation.
15 Article 10–15 ESA Regulation.
16 Article 290–291 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), OJ C 83, 30.3.2010, pp. 1–388.
17 For more details see (Moloney 2011).
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soft-law tool). At first sight, quasi-regulative competences seem almost powerless, but upon closer
examination, it is indeed a regulative competence. In particular, the fact that, in the case of ESAs
technical standards drafts, the European Commission practically does not interfere shows that the
entity that forms these standards is currently the ESAs.
The ESFS could be seen as a real initial step to the single market with single and unified
supervision, which has followed the banking union. It is one of the reactions to/consequences
of the financial crisis of 2008. For legal and political reasons, only competencies that allow direct
intervention in the operation of the financial market were endowed as a last resort for intervention in
this first step of creating new supervisory bodies (which have been created within the ESFS).
A result that had come from the establishment of the ESFS brought the maximum possible effect
achievable at that time. It was the first “curtailment” of some degree of sovereignty and exclusive
powers of the supervisory authorities of member states. As such, a new direction can then move
forward and supervisory powers could be even further (but not entirely) centralized, in the name of
“public interest”.
However, the current model of sector supervision of three European supervisory authorities could
be changed in order to achieve better coordination and cooperation of ESAs sectors. The one-peak
model could be more beneficial than just merging supervision over credit institutions and insurance
companies (the twin-peak model) due to possible improvements in the coordination of ESAs’ work
and outputs, the deepening interdependence of individual financial market segments and potential
savings of the ESAs’ activities.
In general, ESAs’ priority should focus on resolving real problems and ambiguities regarding the
implementation of new regulations; but on the other hand, it should also be an authority with more
centralized power over the financial market to be able to act as a supranational authority in certain
cases. Only this could bring efficiency of supervision in the single market.
3. Banking Union
The process of integration of financial market supervision could be described as a process of
changes in the supervisory system of the financial market as a response to the financial crisis. The first
step for system changes was analyzed above, based on the Larosiér report. This step was a preparatory
stage for real integration. The legal power of ESFS authorities has been greatly reduced, and the direct
application of competences conferred on the ongoing activities in the financial market were perceived
as final and somewhat extreme solutions. However, the first step was a major impetus for dynamic,
real and direct supervision at the European level. The reform of the supervision system proceeds to the
second step, which already leads to the formation of direct supervision implemented at the European
level, which is referred to as a banking union.
As the financial crisis evolved and turned into the Eurozone debt crisis, it became apparent that a
deeper integration of the banking system was necessary for countries that shared the Euro and were
even more interdependent. Consequently, on the basis of the European Commission roadmap for the
creation of a banking union, the EU institutions agreed to establish a Single Supervisory Mechanism
and a Single Resolution Mechanism for banks. The banking union applies to countries in the Euro
area. Non-Euro-area countries may join as well.
Prior to the creation of the banking union, prudential rules took place at the level of the local
supervisory agencies, and this led to the diversity in supervision among the member states. The internal
financial market was thus prevented from being realized, with the real possibility easing potential
risks (Wyemersch 2012). The banking union is thus potentially a much stronger move towards the
integration of financial market supervision.
The banking union is essentially an integrated financial framework resting upon three pillars.
The first pillar is the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the second is the Single Resolution
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Mechanism (SRM), and finally, the third pillar is the Common Deposit Guarantee Scheme (CDGS),
which is based on several European directives and regulations.18
These three pillars are supplemented by a single rulebook that provides a single set of harmonized
prudential rules that need be respected by all institutions within the EU. It is then a unified aggregate
of norms for the banking sector. It consists of Union regulations and directives accompanied by
harmonizing and implementing technical norms approved by the European Commission and prepared
by the EBA (Kalman 2014).
In the author’s opinion, the prudential rules of the single rulebook are evident in several areas of
the banking union. They include the capital requirements for banking institutions (in particular, the
CRR, CRD IV, and Basel III), the aim of which is to strengthen the ability of the EU banking sector to
survive periods of economic uncertainty, to improve risk management, and to ensure standard lending
during periods of economic recession. They also include recovery and resolution mechanisms for the
crisis management of credit institutions according to the BRRD Directive. Last but not least, there is
also a system of deposit insurance, which is compulsory for all EU member states. All the rules are
accompanied by technical norms (the RTS and the ITS) drawn up by the EBA and approved by the
European Commission, along with general rules of the EBA and supplementary documents. These are
arguably the most important European rules applied in all EU countries (i.e., not only in the Eurozone
or just the banking union). Needless to say, the single aggregate of rules is one method of ensuring
consistent application of the legislative framework for banking regulation across the EU. Ideally, it
should ultimately bring about financial (economic) stability within the EU.
The author does not consider the single rulebook as another (fourth) pillar of the banking union;19
it seems to be a structure of rules that are applicable inside as well as outside the three established
pillars of the banking union (see Scheme 1 bellow).
18 Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 of 15th October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (hereinafter the ‘SSM Regulation’)
- European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No. 1022/2013 of 22nd October 2013 amending Regulation (EU)
No. 1093/2013 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards the conferral
of specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013.
- Regulation (EU) No. 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16th April 2014 establishing the framework for
cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national competent
authorities and with national designated authorities (hereinafter the ‘SSM Framework Regulation’).
- Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15th May 2014 establishing a framework for
the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC,
and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and
2013/30/EU, and Regulations (EU) No. 1093/2010 and (EU) No. 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the
Council. Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (hereinafter the BRRD Directive’).
- Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15th July 2014 establishing uniform
rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework
of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010
(hereinafter the ‘SRM Regulation’).
- Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, which forms
the basis of the single European aggregate for all institutions (capital requirements, capital ratios, the mechanisms for
calculating capital requirements, liquidity rules, mechanisms for calculating leverage ratio). Capital Requirements
Regulation (hereinafter the ‘CRR Regulation’).
- Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of
credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive
2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, which implements Basel III into Union law.
Fourth Capital Requirements Directive (hereinafter the ‘CRD IV Directive’).
- Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes.
Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (hereinafter the ‘DGSD Directive’).
19 A different opinion is voiced by e.g., (Tomsik 2012). He says here that the Single Rulebook created by the EBA is the fourth
pillar of the banking union. I believe though it includes more single rules than just those created by the EBA and all these
rules blend with the other three pillars.
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matter will be carried out for the first time in history of the EU. What are the consequences and
outcomes of these relationships?
3.1. Banking Union and Non-Eurozone Countries
Eurozone countries are those with a fully operational banking union; together with some specific
parts and “details” of the second pillar, the first pillar is most relevant for these countries.
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s st f t r c tri s ill r li r t ir ct s r isi f t , ic
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c r ise to be arrived at—the direct supervision of the ECB will be realized only over systemically
important financial institutions, or rather important20 credit institutions (banks), which, however, cover
over 85% of the banking assets21 in the Eurozone by means of 123 banking groups (Nouy 2015) anyway.
Supervision over the other banks will be carried out by national supervisory authorities with the
option to delegate the power to the ECB, if it accepts it. The EU emergency funds are supposed to offer
help directly to banks in trouble, and the ECB assumes the main supervisory tasks such as granting and
revoking the license, supervising risk transactions, issuing directives and recommendations, issuing
binding decisions along with effective supervision, monitoring and enforcing the observation of capital
20 The notion of importance is linked with t e size of the bank—the number of assets, its influence on the EU as well as the
national economy, the importance of cross-border transactions etc. More specifically direct supervision will be realized in
case one of the following criteria is met: the total number of assets is worth 30 billion EUR; the ratio of total assets to the
GDP of an EU member is higher than 20% (not applicable if the total number of assets is worth less than 5 billion EUR);
Having notified the national supervisory authority the ECB labels a particular bank as important; the ECB upon its own
initiative labels a bank as important if the bank has subsidiaries in more EU countries and cross-border assets or bonds
form the majority if their assets or bonds; if a bank has asked for or received financial support from the EFSF or the ESM; or,
regardless of the criteria above, a bank is one of three biggest banks in a particular member country.
21 The criterion of total assets suggests that 32% of the banks are French, 22% are German, 14% are Spanish, 10% are Italian
and Dutch and 13% are from the remaining Eurozone countries. There are 3520 less important banks, 48% of which are
German (1688), 16% are Austrian, and 15% are Italian banks. (Veron 2015).
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requirements for banks according to the CRD Directives,22 performing supervision on a consolidated
basis and sharing supplementary supervisory tasks through financial conglomerates. The ECB also
possesses a relatively wide range of investigative competence, as it can impose administrative sanctions,
assess mergers and credit institutions acquisitions.23
National supervisory authorities are responsible for the less important supervisory tasks such as
day-by-day supervision, consumer protection, supervision over money laundering, payment services
and setting up branches from third countries—they must comply with the directives and regulations
issued by the ECB.
The EBA also plays an important role under the SSM, because it ensures effective and consistent
implementation of the single set of rules in the banking sector. Moreover, it co-prepares stress testing
for banks carried out by the ECB, which co-ordinates stress testing in the entire EU.
3.1.2. Area of Single Resolution Mechanism
The participants of the second pillar are basically all EU countries, but the main important
difference could be found in the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is set up for Eurozone countries
and their national funds. Countries out of the Eurozone collect a contribution from credit institutions
to their own national resolution funds, and when there is a need to start a resolution mechanism, it
gets financial support only from this national source. The question to be asked here is what is better,
more operative and reasonable in a case in which a resolution mechanism is started.
This authority—SRF is financed by banking institutions—and its creation will last for eight years
(i.e., it is completion is planned for 2024). Every year, the participating countries should pay one-eighth
of the total amount attributable to each country. The funds available in the SRF should reach at least 1 %
of the covered deposits of all credit institutions of the banking union members. It is expected that the
fund will have about 55 billion EUR at its disposal. The individual contributions of each credit institution
is calculated according to the ratio between the total amount of its liabilities (excluding the capital and
covered deposits) and the aggregate liabilities (again excluding the capital and covered deposits) of all
the credit institutions authorized in the participating member states. The calculation process will also
take into consideration the risks taken by the given institution (European Council 2014).
The contributions from credit institutions will be received by the participating member states
through their national funds and then transferred to the SRF, which will be activated. The finance
can only be used if the principles stipulated in the BRRD Directive and the SRM Regulation are
observed and if shareholders and private creditors take part in the recovery plans. During the
eight-year transition period, these national funds should gradually merge while the contributions
collected by each national fund will be shared as well. This transfer and sharing of finance from
the national resolution funds is regulated by the above-mentioned Intergovernmental Agreement
(the IGA). Before the SRF has enough financial means, the system of financing is ensured during the
transition period by means of domestic funds based on banking contributions, alternatively from the
European Stability Mechanism. Another option is to transfer the money from one national resolution
fund to another; if that happens, the help is financed from the banking sector contributions.
Since the beginning of 2016, one-eighth of the contributions has been transferred to the SRF.
All countries participating in banking union have contributed, with the exception of Portugal, Spain,
Greece and Italy. These countries have no money in their national funds due to the fact that they
have financed the recovery of their local banks (mostly a prohibited way of part bail-out financing).
A decision as to what the next step for the European Commission will be has not been reached yet; in
22 The setting of higher or supplementary capital buffers according to Basel III or the CRD IV: systemic risk buffer and
counter-cyclical buffer.
23 See more about SSM (Ferran and Babis 2013; Niknejad 2014).
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the author’s view, there is no other option for the Commission but to take legal action against these
countries if they fail to transfer the money even in the extra time provided.
This is maybe one of the negative points of the supranational Single Resolution Fund in cases
where there are no contributions from some countries. The solidarity and motivation might not be
very stable in these situations for countries that contribute properly when they realize that some
countries simply do not. The national fund might be bit faster in activation, but on the other hand it is
just smaller.
Besides these facts, the author does not have any other opinion about the positives and negatives
of the supranational fund as compared to national ones, because some years of practice with these
funds are needed to find out what might be a smarter solution for a resolution.
3.1.3. General Part
The possibility of entering the voluntarily banking union for non-Eurozone countries should be
mentioned as well. Romania and Bulgaria will do so, and Denmark has declared it as well.
What are the main differences for non-Eurozone countries in comparison with Eurozone ones?
By entering the banking union, the author means primarily centralized supervision, especially for
major credit institutions, from participating states associated, inter alia, with a major administrative
shift of supervision. Entering the banking union voluntarily will bring about the transfer of
substantial supervision agenda to the capacity of the ECB, i.e., it will result in a so-called regime
of close cooperation between the national supervisor and the ECB. This shift of supervision would
apply particularly to important credit institutions whose supervision would take over the ECB.
The supervision of smaller credit institutions would be kept by a national supervisor, but it would have
to follow the instructions and regulations of the ECB, to ensure a coherent approach to supervision in
all countries with an emphasis on the period of potential instability. If a non-Eurozone country enters
a banking union before it becomes part of the Eurozone, the ECB will conduct supervision through a
national supervisory authority, because the ECB has no direct competence in relation to institutions
outside the Eurozone. This also means that any country that is not in the Eurozone must produce
adequate legislative measures to ensure that the national supervisory authority will be able to comply
with the ECB measures and adopt these measures.
From the political point of view, the benefit of entering a banking union comes along with an
official declaration of participation in the euro integration. This could subsequently result in a higher
potential in promoting national strategic interests at the EU level, and it would also strengthen the
competitiveness of local credit institutions in the European financial market. Other more general
contributions should consist in strengthening the stability of the local financial markets.
The main reason for the “holding attitude” of non-entering the SSM is a fear of losing supervisory
powers over large credit institutions. There is also a potential increase in the risk of the spread of
financial instability to the local subsidiaries of international holdings without an effective possibility
for the national supervisory authority to perform and adopt its own solution. One of the other reasons
is mandatory participation in financing the supervision of the ECB.
There are some other more political aspects together with the holding position of most of the
non-Eurozone countries, because they all wait for and see what is going to happen and whether some
positive outcome will be proven. It is all still very new and untested.
On the other hand, the fear of international financial instability spreading is not the real reason.
It is complete nonsense to have a stable financial market at the local level when there is instability in
an important part of the EU, because there is nothing resembling a local financial market anymore.
The financial market is very international and so interconnected, and institutions operating in different
countries are fundamentally linked to their parent companies. That is the reason why the single
supervisory mechanism is the most important and primary one. Local—the daily supervision of
the functioning of the individual subsidiary entities and affiliates—is still very important, but it is a
secondary concern from a global point of view.
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3.2. Financial Market of EU and EFTA Countries
There are a few reasons why the author has chosen this article comparison of the relation between
the EU and three non-EU countries in this area. These three countries are member states of the
Agreement on the European Economic Area24 (the EEA) and also participate in the European Free
Trade Association25 (the EFTA).
One of the reasons is that Norway is the first European country to have introduced integrated
supervision over the financial market, so it is interesting to find out whether their pioneering decision
brought about any particularities or differences in comparison with the method or the system of
supervision in the EU. Moreover, Norwegian banks are very busy in cross-border business with EU
members, particularly in Scandinavia. The Financial Stability Board list mentions Nordea26 as a global
systemically important bank. These reasons, including the closely intertwined business relations, make
the relation between the EFTA and the EU worthwhile.
Because of the existence of the Agreement on the EEA and because of the fact that the single
financial market evidently falls within the four freedoms this agreement helps to establish, it is clear
that financial market regulation and supervision in all EFTA countries is legislatively extremely similar
to the system in the EU—in fact, they are based on it.
Essentially, the EU regulations become part of the legal system of EFTA countries only after they
have become integrated into the agreement on the EEA. All supervisory authorities in these countries
are part of the EFTA Working Group on Financial Services, which is a group coordinating the opinions
of EFTA countries on the integration of basic financial legal norms into the Agreement on the EEA.
The basic tenet of the Agreement on the EEA is its flexibility and, to a certain extent, homogeneity
with the EU single market. Amendments that are made to EU legislation and are relevant to the EEA are
gradually implemented into the Agreement on the EEA via the decisions of the EEA Joint Committee27
and the subsequent ratification of these decisions in national legal systems. Since 1994, more than 7000
EU legal regulations have been implemented in this way (Fredriksen and Franklin 2015). For example,
it is immensely interesting that the legal system in Norway is very pragmatic as far as foreign languages
and legislation are concerned—a large number of EU regulations become part of Norwegian law even
before they have been translated into the Norwegian language.28
24 The Agreement was signed on the 1st January 2004 by the European Commission, EU member countries and three EFTA
countries that wished to participate in the European free trade association. The main objective of the EEA Agreement is to
ensure in all 31 states the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital—the ‘four freedoms’. As a result of this
agreement, Union law is, as far as the four freedoms are concerned, implemented into the national legal system of EFTA
countries. All new relevant EU legal regulations are also implemented into the EEA Agreement so they apply to the entire
EEA area (not just the EU) and they ensure a unified application of legal norms relating to a single market. In this case we
refer to the norms as EEA relevant. EFTA countries are, however, not fully responsible, unlike the EU member countries.
25 European Free Trade Association ‘EFTA’ includes Norway, Iceland, and Lichtenstein.
26 It is a Nordic financial group active mainly in the North of Europe. This bank is a product of mergers and acquisitions of
Finland, Danish, Norwegian and Swedish banks Merita Bank, Unibank, Kreditkassen (Christiania Bank) and Nordbanken,
which took place from 1997 to 2000. The Baltic countries and Poland are today also considered to be part of the domestic
market. The largest shareholder of Nordea is Sampo, a Finnish insurance company with around 20% of the shares. Nordea
is listed on the stock exchanges in Copenhagen, Helsinki, and Stockholm. Nordea’s headquarters is in Stockholm and it
has more than 1400 branches. The bank is present in 19 countries all over the world and it operates through full service
branches, subsidiaries and representative offices. Source: wikipedia.org.
27 The EEA Joint Committee is in charge of the execution of the EEA Agreement. It holds regular meetings six (or eight) times
a year. It is a forum where problems are discussed and decisions are accepted on the basis of a consensus regarding the
implementation of EU norms into the EEA Agreement. Before the Treaty of Lisbon was signed, the EEA Joint Committee
was comprised of representatives of EEA and EFTA countries and the European Commission. In agreement with the Treaty
of Lisbon, responsibility for the co-ordination of EEA issues was transferred from the European Commission to the European
External Action Service after this institution was created on the 1st December 2010.
28 In view of the fact that such norms are at that time published in English and Swedish; both languages are well understood
by everyone in Norway. In Norway the only legal language is not Norwegian. The EEA Agreement lacks a provision as the
one found in Article 297 of the TFEU (procedure for the adaption of acts), so the decisions made by the EEA Joint Committee
can come into effect even before their legal translations is published in Norwegian or Icelandic in the EEA Official Journal,
where all new legislation of the EEA is published (like the norms of the EU).
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All EFTA countries participate in EU authorities, such as the highly relevant ESA authorities.
The reason is that the secondary legislation of the EU (which is, among other things, produced by the
ESA authorities) is incorporated into the EEA Agreement through a rather complicated procedure in
case the legislation is relevant to the principles and rules stipulated in the Agreement (in other words,
if it is EEA relevant). There is no denying that in the financial market area, most regulations are EEA
relevant—they then get through the EEA Agreement into the legal system of EFTA countries.
In the financial market area, the co-operation between EFTA countries and the EU is extremely
close, since both parties are keen to make sure that the operation of the financial market is as effective
as possible. The ESA authorities are essentially fundamental European authorities producing relevant
regulations and the fact that EFTA countries do not have the full membership of these authorities causes
considerable problems. These authorities adopt various EEA relevant decisions and regulations that
are later adopted by EFTA countries as well, but, crucially, they have no fully-fledged representative
there (it only has a kind of an observer), and it therefore cannot voice its opinion regarding the adopted
acts—the capacity of EFTA representatives is solely advisory. Another obstacle is the fact that once the
EEA Joint Committee decides to implement an act into the EEA Agreement, it must then be adopted
via the legislative procedure into national law—Constitutions of EFTA countries do not allow for
any other option. Such a process of implementation is rather awkward, and it causes a great many
problems. The biggest problem, however, is the delay in implementing EU acts in the EEA Agreement
and, subsequently, into individual national legal systems—this may lead to considerable overload on
the EEA Joint Committee; more often than not, the delay is caused by one country that obstructs or
intentionally impedes the process of transposition in the EEA Joint Committee.29 EFTA countries have
attempted to solve the problem several times by accepting unilateral transposition of some regulations
into their national legal systems, but these are nothing more than provisional solutions with a rather
unclear legal foundation.30
The easiest option is the acceptance of EFTA countries’ representatives as fully-fledged members
of the ESA authorities, including a voting and decision-making right. From the perspective of
constitutional law, this enables the possibility to transfer the sovereignty to authorities that could be
accepted as joint EEA authorities (Fredriksen and Franklin 2015).31
This solution appears to have been applied on 30 September 2016, when the EEA Joint Committee
decided to implement the directives establishing the ESA Authorities (EBA, EIOPA, ESMA and the
ESBR)32; that problem left EFTA countries in a tight spot to a certain extent. However, the parallel
structures (the EU and the EEA) created problems not only for EFTA countries, but also for the financial
institutions of the countries that conduct business with EFTA countries.
In June 2017, the EEA Joint Committee adopted a package of decisions to incorporate 31 EU
legal norms establishing the European Financial Supervisory Authorities, including the regulations
establishing ESA authorities.
The issues surrounding the EEA Agreement and European legislation (and its implementation in
EFTA countries) is naturally a much deeper phenomenon that far exceeds the scope of this article.
29 EFTA countries can delay the effect of the implementation of Union norms even after an agreement has been reached in the
EEA Joint Committee. The can do so by claiming that they need to implement the norm into their own constitution (e.g., by
means of parliamentary ratification). Subsequently, the transposition deadline is six months; yet, if it is announced that the
time needed is going to be longer than six months, the EEA Joint Committee’s decision remains ineffective.
30 Mainly because they do not guarantee that the EU and member countries accept such acts as equal to the legally binding
EU/EEA norms; likewise, they do not grant economic entities from EFTA any rights they could claim within the EU pillar
regarding the EEA.
31 In this case, there would have to be solution to the problem concerning what to do in cases when the European Commission
or the Council can influence the decision making of the EU authorities; most probably the best option is to transfer this
competence to the EEA Joint Committee. Event his would not be far from ideal, particularly in urgent situations when
national interests at are stake—yet, one can hardly find a better alternative in the structures of the EEA.
32 However, this solution addresses to a certain extent, only the problems associated with ESA authorities, but there are many
more EU authorities and agencies. A more comprehensive solution is needed—one that involves all EU authorities that
make decisions and are EEA relevant.
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It seems that the solution to the most pressing problem outlined above has perhaps been found.
The solution should be acceptable to all EEA Agreement members.
I am certain that there was no possible solution other than to make the representatives of EFTA
countries equal to their European counterparts in order to prevent any delays in the transposition of
EU norms into national legal systems while enabling EFTA representatives to take part in the very
creation of these norms (issued by authorities such as the ESA). However, secondary problems of
the constitutional orders of EFTA countries fall under the competence of individual countries—so
they need to tackle the problem of setting the system of accepting EU norms when its members have
become fully-fledged members of the ESA authorities.
All EEA Agreement countries are interested in a fully operational single market to which the
EEA Agreement contributes; that is why all parties involved (including the EU member countries)
benefit from co-operation being as effective as possible also at the EEA level. I am certain that the close
cooperation and the relatively prompt implementation of the EEA relevant regulations bring Europe
(closer) to a single market.
As far as EU supervisory colleges are concerned, what is worth pointing out is the intersection
of EU law with Norwegian supervision, for Finanstilsynet33 is the main supervisory authority in the
DNB supervisory college—the DNB is a Norwegian bank operating internationally, including the
EU (the majority shareholder is the state, which is an enormous advantage given the bank’s rating).
The main task of the college is the preparation of a common assessment of risk and capital for the
entire DNB Group, and the college is also responsible for the application of recovery plans that deal
with capital adequacy and liquidity failures and proposing measures in compliance with the BRRD
Directive. Recovery plans and their application must be assessed by the college, which may result in
further comments and statements. Also, this supervisory authority is involved in nine supervisory
colleges for foreign banks active in Norway.
Here we can see the evident interconnection between member and non-member EU countries.
The financial market (and its institutions) is so interconnected internationally that the question of
whether or not a specific country is an EU member is not of such great importance—a financial
institution licensed in a country such as that is usually active in other countries as well, and that is
why it is beneficial to cooperate internationally and to unify supervisory rules to a certain extent. In
this case, a supervisory authority outside the EU is the main authority in one supervisory college and
a member of other supervisory colleges whose other members are predominantly from the EU, which
brings about the acceptance and harmonization of EU rules in a non-EU zone as well. The crucial
aspect is the existence of the EEA Agreement between EFTA and EU countries, which means that
most financial market regulations are EEA relevant; as a consequence, EFTA countries are obliged to
implement such regulations into their own legal systems.
3.3. EFTA—EU Summary
The EEA Agreement34 defines the form and mechanism of acceptance and subsequent application
of EU norms and regulations in the law of EFTA countries (if they are EEA relevant). The legislation
of these countries includes widely transposed EU legislation (since it is mostly EEA relevant), which
is yet further proof of international harmonization (even outside the EU) and the importance of a
Europe-wide (not just EU-wide) single market. We might say that a national financial market does
33 This body performs micro-prudential supervision over individual financial institutions with particular focus on analyses of
economic shocks that may wreak havoc on the financial sector. Currently the biggest risks are connected with the so-called
‘bubbles’ in the credit and property markets. The monitoring is predominantly based on a group of indicators and analyses
covering six main categories and capturing micro as well as macro factors. See Macro prudential supervision of the financial
system—organization and instruments (Norges Bank 2012).
34 The author is certain, that one of the greatest incentives for the EEA Agreement is strong European interconnection and
close co-operation as well as the existence of a supranational financial market and an enormous Europe-wide demand for a
single market in accordance with the four freedoms of the EEA Agreement.
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not really exist (given the intertwined international structure of the economy and the financial market
being a part of it as well); hence the need to perceive the financial market as a global entity comprised
of national financial markets. The author is sure that any other method of regulation and supervision35
in member or non-member countries is neither suitable nor feasible, because at present, a national
financial market cannot operate in a way that is isolated from the financial markets in other countries.
EFTA countries contribute not only to their own financial stability, but also to international financial
stability due to the high number of supranational interconnections in the financial market that simply
fail to respect borders, whether they be those of the EU, Europe, or indeed, the entire world.
The above-mentioned statement is basically the author’s opinion based on an international point
of view of the economy. Financial institutions play a very important role in the economic system and
systemically important institutions are those with cross-border activities. There is no border for these
institutions, just administrative barriers, which should be removed (if possible) when the single market
is the goal.
4. Conclusions
Even in its current, incomplete form, the banking union presents a radical change that profoundly
modifies the nature of European integration and the balance between member states and European
institutions. Its full impact has yet to be appreciated, as there is a complex mixture of healthy skepticism,
misguided cynicism and indolent inattention (Veron 2015). The internal market is the real goal for the
integration of the financial market, and supervision integration is only one aspect of this. In recent
years, significant progress towards this goal has been achieved in the project of the banking union and
its single supervision mechanism and single resolution mechanism.
The basis of the banking union can be seen in the 2013–2014 European legislation. The first step
was the assessment of 130 banks in the Eurozone and the subsequent takeover of the basic supervisory
authority by the ECB on 4 November 2014. The process through which supervision is to be transitioned
is incomplete as of yet, and it is thus currently very difficult to assess the banking union; any attempt
to do so must inevitably be rather premature. The process reached its peak in January 2016—the
resolution board acquired the power to issue binding decisions, including the discretionary power to
impose a specific resolution instrument; furthermore, the bail-in instrument of the BRRD Directive
became applicable: the instrument that makes shareholders, creditors and uninsured depositors carry
the burden of financial loss of an insolvent bank. Even after this date, it will take some time before
things settle down and we can assess the structural organization of the banking Union. Moreover,
a supranational single resolution fund is still being built from the original form of equal national
resolution funds—this process should be completed by 2024. Although the process of building the
banking union started three years ago, it is still in its early stages.
In a way, every financial crisis (or even an unpleasant situation) purifies the system from
undesirable features. How negative the impact of a crisis seems to be a question of legislation,
preventive measures and public attitude towards it. What it surely brings about is a reaction in the
form of new instruments and measures that aim to cushion the damage that has been already caused
and to prevent such a crisis in the future. This chapter on the European integration of regulation and
supervision leading to the foundation of the banking union describes processes that clearly exemplify
it. The banking union is by far the deepest and most comprehensive legal framework of the entire
financial market, not only in terms of regulation and supervision. As to its imperfections, one example
is the lack of a fiscal union in the EU. Such a union would bring the single market project much closer
to its ultimate goal.
35 The other methods are all those decentralized. In these cases, when countries protect their own market with certain rules,
legislation and customs we cannot find any future economic growth or financial stability in globalized economy, which is
present reality.
Int. J. Financial Stud. 2018, 6, 20 15 of 17
It is not yet possible to evaluate the banking union and its effectiveness, and it will remain as
such at least until the SSM and the SRM become fully operational and until they are given sufficient
time to show the results of their activities. The trend that had been set before the banking union
was established has now intensified thanks to the banking union and its involvement in the area of
regulation and supervision of financial institutions—the issue to be resolved is the ideal proportion
of regulation and supervision in relation to the administrative demands and expenses of financial
institutions, which is then reflected in the services and their prices (e.g., banking fees). In the area
of supervision and regulation, we have not witnessed any liberalization attempts; i.e., attempts that
would make legislation less strict, at least. Is it at all possible that we see a complete reversal of the
trend though? In the authors mind, general liberalization of supervision and regulation is not really
viable; yet, I the author am convinced that legislation will stabilize itself as the effects of the recent
financial crisis wear off and economic growth becomes positively stable. It is uncertain whether this
stabilization will come after the banking union becomes fully operational; the author presumes that
it will take a little longer and probably “only” until another crisis arises—this crisis will inevitably
happen, but we might feel optimistic that its impact will be much less severe.
It is going to be very interesting to monitor upcoming actions connected with Brexit in relation to
the banking union. The UK is not part of the Eurozone, so the SSM is not very relevant, but SRM is in
some aspects. The UK, however, proceeds in accordance with the Single Resolution Authority, and the
National Resolution Fund fills up in the same way as the other member states. Formally, the UK is still
part of the EU, and individual obligations must be respected.
The future is, however, very uncertain and still unpredictable, and it is also very possible that the
UK will join the current EFTA countries with economic collaboration (no longer politically) with the
EU. When the UK becomes one of the EFTA countries, some of the issues in EFTA countries under the
EEA Agreement mentioned above will become topical for the UK.
What are the other options for the UK from the economic point of view? One of them is certainly
a complex group of multilateral contracts with the EU or other countries, similar to Switzerland.
There are some differences compared to the EEA Agreement, but basically, the goal is the same—easier
cross-border economic collaboration. The costs of this might be higher (longer administration
procedure including acceptance and implementation of the local government), but there should
be greater legislative freedom.
The other option that was recently raised is Nafta (North American Free Trade Agreement), but
in the author’s opinion, it would not make sense to join Nafta given that the UK is geographically
somewhere else. What could the advantage of such an agreement be? It is hard to find any, especially
in a situation where the reality and future of Nafta is very unstable.
The question regarding economic collaboration between the EU and the UK is not “if at all”, but
rather “how and when”.
However, this is unlikely to be known until the UK leaving of the EU becomes a final fact and
reality. Then, we might find the way for economic collaboration and a legal framework between the
EU and the UK. It is certainly needed for both parties. Based on the author’s opinion, the best solution
for both parties is a situation in which the UK becomes an EFTA country, and that is the reason why an
important part of this article deals with EFTA countries and the EEA Agreement.
A very fitting comment was made by Jurgen Habermas, who said: “Without a common financial
and economic policy, the national economies of pseudo-sovereign member states will continue to
drift apart in terms of productivity. No political community can sustain such tension in the long run.
At the same time, by focusing on the avoidance of open conflict, the EU’s institutions are preventing
the political initiatives necessary for expanding the currency union into a political union. Only the
government leaders assembled in the European Council are in a position to act, but precisely they
are the ones who are unable to act in the interest of a joint European community, because they think
mainly of their national electorate. We are stuck in a political trap. [ . . . ] Over the course of the
crisis, the European executive has accrued more and more authority. Key decisions are being taken
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by the council, the commission and the ECB—in other words, the very institutions that are either
insufficiently legitimated to take such decisions or lack any democratic basis. [ . . . ] The currency
union must gain the capacity to act at the supra-national level. In view of the chaotic political process
triggered by the crisis in Greece, we can no longer afford to ignore the limits of the present method of
intergovernmental compromise.” (Oltermann 2015).
This comment shows something what is much needed also for integrated financial
supervision—centralized institutions must gain the real and full capacity to act at the supranational
level. The author does not see any possible way other than the centralization of powers and
competences in order to bring about a real single market with the same rules and same supervision
within the EU.
In conclusion, the author would like to state that having carried out considerable research, he
is now utterly convinced that the integration of supervision is a process tried and tested to a large
extent over the years, and it is also the right trend in supervision in view of the interconnectedness
of international financial markets. New activities in the EU (the creation of the banking union, in
particular) represent more concentrated efforts to integrate supervision. It is still in it the early stages,
and every detail has not been specified and successfully dealt with yet; it will also take some time
before the banking union is in its final form and fully operational. Prior to that, it would be unfair and
unprofessional to pass judgment. The author can still conclude that banking union is not the final
and ultimate solution for complete and integrated supervision within the EU, but it is another step
forward. So many competences were relocated from the national to the supranational level, and it was
all unimaginable 20 years ago, so it means a lot, but still more competences must be centralized to fulfill
the goal. The whole process of integrated supervision and the banking union must be completed with
a common financial and economic policy directing towards political union. Probably only political
union could justify the complete centralization of important competences to the supranational level.
One conclusion is very clear: integrated supervision without the UK is possible and Brexit does
not change anything in the current process.
The reasons outlined above justify the continuation of the process not only in the EU, but also
globally; it is in our best interests to keep supporting and developing the integration of financial
market supervision and to keep harmonizing the practices and mechanisms of supervision. Ideally, all
should actively participate in this process.
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.
References
Blessing, Martin. 2013. Financial and Fiscal Stability beyond the Crisis Years: Two Paradigm Shifts and their
Consequences. In Stability of the Financial System: Illusion or Feasible Concept? Edited by Dombret, Andreas
and Otto Lucius. Cheltenha: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Council of the European Union. 2009. Agreed Council Conclusions on Strengthening EU Financial Supervision.
Brussels: Council of the European Union, p. 5.
Emmenegger, Susan. 2010. Procedural Consumer Protection and Financial Market Supervision. EUI Working
Papers Law No. 2010/05. p. 7. Available online: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1616322 (accessed on 8 June 2017).
European Parliament. 2017. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council. Com(2017) 536
final. Brussels 20.9.2017. Brussels: European Parliament, p. 8.
Ferran, Eilis, and Kern Alexander. 2011. Can Soft Bodies Be Effective? Soft Systemic Risk Oversight Bodies and
the Special Case of European System Risk Board. University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper
No. 36/2011. pp. 30–64. Available online: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1676140
(accessed on 7 August 2017).
Ferran, Eilis, and Valia S. G. Babis. 2013. The European Single Supervisory Mechanism. University of Cambridge
Faculty of Law Research Paper 10/2013. Available online: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2224538 (accessed on
10 August 2017).
Int. J. Financial Stud. 2018, 6, 20 17 of 17
Fredriksen, Halvard Haukeland, and Christian N. K. Franklin. 2015. Of pragmatism and principles: The EEA
Agreement 20 years on. Common Market Law Review 52: 629–84.
Goldby, Miriam, and Anat Keller. 2010. The Commission’s proposal for a new European Systemic Risk Board: An
evolution. Law and Financial Market Review 4: 51. [CrossRef]
House of Lords. 2009. The Future of EU Financial Regulation and Supervision, Volume I: Report. London: Authority of
the House of Lords, p. 12. Available online: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/
ldeucom/106/10604.htm (accessed on 5 January 2017).
Kalman, Janos. 2014. The reform of financial supervisory system of the European Union. International Relations
Quarterly 5: 9.
Moloney, Niamh. 2011. The European Securities and Markets Authority and institutional design for the EU
financial market—A tale of two competences: Part (1) Rule-Making. European Business Organization Law
Review 12: 41–86. [CrossRef]
Niknejad, Mandana. 2014. European Union towards the Banking Union, Single Supervisory Mechanism and
Challenges on the Road Ahead. European Journal of Legal Studies 7: 92–124. Available online: http://www.
ejls.eu/15/186UK.htm (accessed on 25 May 2017).
Norges Bank. 2012. Report from a Working Group Consisting of Representatives from Norges Bank, the Financial
Supervisory Authority of Norway. Oslo: Finanstilsynet and the Ministry of Finance, p. 12.
Nouy, Danièle. 2015. The European Banking Landscape—Initial Conclusions after Four Months of Joint Banking
Supervision and the Main Challenges Ahead. Paper presented at ‘SZ Finance Day’ in Frankfurt, Frankfurt,
Germany, 17 March.
Oltermann, Philip. 2015. Jürgen Habermas’s Verdict on the EU/Greece Debt Deal—Full Transcript. THE
GUARDIAN Interview with Habermas, J. Published 16th July. Available online: http://www.theguardian.
com/commentisfree/2015/jul/16/jurgen-habermas-eu-greece-debt-deal (accessed on 17 January 2018).
Pfalzer, Juliette J. W. 2014. Naming and shaming in financial market regulations: A violation of the presumption
of innocence? Utrecht Law Review 10: 134–48. [CrossRef]
Rodriguez, Pablo Iglesias. 2009. Towards a New European Financial Supervision Architecture. Columbia Journal
of European Law Online 16: 1–6. Available online: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1518062 (accessed on 5 November 2017).
Scholten, Miroslava, and Michiel Luchtman. 2017. Law Enforcement by EU Authorities: Implications for Political and
Judicial Accountability. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 55.
European Council. 2014. Single Resolution Mechanism. Available online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cs/
policies/banking-union/single-resolution-mechanism/ (accessed on 6 June 2016).
Tabellini, G. 2008. Why Did Bank Supervision Fail? The First Global Financial Crisis of the 21st Century. Vox
Publication, Centre for Economic Policy Research, pp. 45–47. Available online: http://www.voxeu.org/
sites/default/files/First_global_crisis.pdf (accessed on 29 June 2017).
Tomsik, Vladimír. 2012. Banking Union: One Size Fits All? p. 13. Available online: http://www.cnb.cz/cs/
verejnost/pro_media/konference_projevy/vystoupeni_projevy/download/tomsik_20121029_cep.pdf
(accessed on 2 April 2017).
Verhelst, Stijn. 2011. Renewed Financial Supervision in Europe—Final or Transitory. Egmont paper No. 44. Gent:
Academia Press, p. 40.
Veron, Nicolas. 2015. Europe’s Radical Banking Union. Bruegel Essay and Lecture Series; Brussels: Bruegel, p. 10.
Wyemersch, Eddy. 2012. The European Banking Union, a First Analysis. Financial Law Institute Working Paper
Series WP 2012-07. p. 3. Available online: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2171785
(accessed on 27 July 2017).
© 2018 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
